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Abstract. Source camera model identification (CMI) and image ma-
nipulation detection are of paramount importance in image forensics. In
this paper, we propose an L2-constrained Remnant Convolutional Neu-
ral Network (L2-constrained RemNet) for performing these two crucial
tasks. The proposed network architecture consists of a dynamic prepro-
cessor block and a classification block. An L2 loss is applied to the output
of the preprocessor block, and categorical crossentropy loss is calculated
based on the output of the classification block. The whole network is
trained in an end-to-end manner by minimizing the total loss, which is a
combination of the L2 loss and the categorical crossentropy loss. Aided
by the L2 loss, the data-adaptive preprocessor learns to suppress the un-
necessary image contents and assists the classification block in extracting
robust image forensics features. We train and test the network on the
Dresden database and achieve an overall accuracy of 98.15%, where all
the test images are from devices and scenes not used during training
to replicate practical applications. The network also outperforms other
state-of-the-art CNNs even when the images are manipulated. Further-
more, we attain an overall accuracy of 99.68% in image manipulation
detection, which implies that it can be used as a general-purpose net-
work for image forensic tasks.
Keywords: Image Forensics, Camera Model Identification, Image Ma-
nipulation Detection, Convolutional Neural Networks
1 Introduction
Camera model identification (CMI) and image manipulation detection are cru-
cial tasks in image forensics with applications in criminal investigations, au-
thenticating evidence, detecting forgery, etc. Digital images go through various
camera-internal processing before being saved in the device [28]. Moreover, they
are often manipulated after they leave the device that has been used to cap-
ture them. Nowadays, professional image editing tools like Adobe Photoshop,
ACDsee, and Hornil Stylepix are readily available, consequently making image
manipulation a common phenomenon [14]. Also, images undergo different kinds
of manipulations when they are shared online. We have observed a proliferation
of digitally altered images with the advent of modern technologies. When the
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authenticity of such images is questioned, a forensic analyst has to answer two
questions first, what is the source of the image under question and whether the
image has been manipulated. The image metadata cannot be trusted as a reli-
able source, as this data can be forged. Therefore, a forensic analyst resorts to
different image forensics techniques to answer these questions.
Image forensics is an active research area, and several methods exist in the lit-
erature for finding out the source camera model and detecting image-processing
operations of a questioned image. But researches are conducted discretely for
finding out the source and manipulation history of an image. In [41], [33], we
can find a brief overview of the approaches proposed over the last two decades.
We see that initial research in CMI has focused on merging image-markers, such
as watermarks, device-specific code, etc. [33]. However, using separate external
features for each camera model is an unmanageable task [18]. Consequently,
researchers have focused on utilizing the intrinsic features, such as the Color
Filter Array (CFA) pattern [6], interpolation algorithms [26], and Image Quality
Metrics (IQM) [22]. Utilizing Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) noise
patterns have been proposed for device-level identification [16], [21]. Although
sensor noise carries device-specific noise artifacts, researchers have developed
methods to perform CMI using sensor noise patterns [43], [29]. Most of these
approaches attempt to extract camera model-specific features and compare the
features with a pre-calculated reference for the corresponding camera model [10].
In the case of image manipulation, traces are found in the image according to the
type of processing it has gone through [5]. Following this theory, researchers have
used distinct forensic approaches for identifying different kinds of image manip-
ulation, such as resizing [34], [19], contrast enhancement [40], [51], and multiple
jpeg compression [7], [31], etc. The drawback of using the above-mentioned sta-
tistical feature-based approaches is that the performance degrades sharply, when
new cases arise that have not been considered during feature vector selection [14].
For that reason, more recent researches have focused on becoming data-driven,
such as utilizing local pixel dependencies used in steganalysis [20], [32] to per-
form CMI [30], [11] and detect image manipulation [35]. In [17], the authors
propose a Gaussian mixture model for image manipulation detection. Though
these approaches provide good results, extracting features for different manip-
ulations requires substantial computational resources, and the performance de-
grades severely depending on the size of the questioned image [14].
Recently, researchers have started applying Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) for image forensic tasks [49]. It is expected as CNNs have performed
extremely well in different image classification tasks [38]. Usually, CNNs tend to
learn features related to the content of an image, whereas, for image forensics,
we need to refrain CNNs from learning image contents [4]. As a result, a common
practice while using CNNs in digital image forensics is adding a preprocessing
layer at the beginning of the CNN architecture. Chen et al. [12] have proposed
using a median filter, whereas Tuama et al. [45] have used a high-pass filter
before feeding images in their respective CNNs. However, such crude filtering is
not supported by the literature as the artifacts introduced by different camera-
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internal processing and manipulations can lie in both low and high frequency
domain [29]. Therefore, fixed filters as preprocessor may lose forensics-related
features. Bayar and Stamm [4] have proposed a data-driven constrained convo-
lutional layer which has performed better than the above-mentioned fixed filters.
Rafi et al. [37] have used a completely data-driven preprocessor block followed
by a classification block to perform CMI. Bayar and Stamm [4] have also used
their constrained CNN for image manipulation detection. However, some CNN
based approaches do not use any preprocessing scheme. Yang et al. use the
idea of multi-scale receptive fields on an input image to perform CMI [50]. In
[8], the authors use CNN and support vector machine (SVM) for CMI, where
they use the CNN part as a feature extractor. In [36], explores the performance
of DenseNet [25] in both CMI and image manipulation detection. In [14], the
authors investigate the performance of densely connected CNNs in image ma-
nipulation detection. Owing to the performance of the data-driven preprocessing
schemes, it can be inferred that further researches need to be conducted to make
the preprocessing operations more robust for image forensic tasks. Several re-
searches exist in the literature that use auxiliary loss function to enhance the
discrimination between learned features [47], [46], [42]. There is a scope of uti-
lizing such auxiliary loss functions in the modular CNN architectures for image
forensics.
Despite the numerous researches conducted in this field, most researchers
have explored CMI and image manipulation detection problems discretely. Bayar
and Stamm [4] show that it is possible to use the same approach for both tasks.
Therefore, research for coming up with a general-purpose neural network suitable
for both CMI and image manipulation detection requires more attention. Also,
strict measures should be followed while conducting experiments so that the
proposed methods can be applied in real-life scenarios. Kirchner and Gloe suggest
that the test set should always consist of images captured by devices that have
not been used during training or validation [28]. Also, the scenes in the test set
should be different from those used during training and validation. Here, scene
refers to a combination of a location and a specific viewpoint. Keeping separate
devices and scenes in the test set is compulsory for replicating real-life conditions
and making the result reliable for practical applications. These evaluation criteria
will ensure that the neural network is free from data leakage [1] during testing
and can not overperform by learning features specific to the device or scene.
Besides, the performances of CMI and image manipulation detection should be
measured using images manipulated at different intensities. We strictly follow
the above-mentioned points in our experiments.
In this paper, we propose a general-purpose novel CNN architecture, called
L2-constrained Remnant Convolutional Neural Network (L2-constrained Rem-
Net) for performing two crucial tasks in image forensics, CMI and image manip-
ulation detection. Our proposed CNN has two parts, a preprocessor block and a
classification block. The preprocessor architecture consists of several data-driven
remnant blocks, and an L2 loss is applied to the output of the preprocessor block.
A CNN based classification block follows the preprocessor block, and categorical
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crossentropy loss is calculated based on its output. The total loss function is a
combination of the L2 loss and the categorical crossentropy loss. The whole net-
work is trained end-to-end while minimizing the total loss. The L2-constrained
preprocessor learns to suppress image contents making it easier for the classifi-
cation block to extract image forensics features. Our experiments show that the
proposed method can outperform other state-of-the-art networks in both image
forensic tasks.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. A brief overview of the general
pipeline of digital images is provided in section 2. Section 3 contains a description
of our proposed CNN and loss function. We discuss our training and evaluation
criteria, along with the experimental results in section 4. Finally, we conclude in
Section 5.
2 Image Acquisition Pipeline
Digital images go through multiple operations from being captured by a digital
camera to being available in different online platforms [28]. We first describe
the image acquisition pipeline of digital cameras, as depicted in Fig. 1. In a
typical digital camera, the light of a scene passes through a system of lenses
and optical filters, which is then collected by an optical sensor. A color filter
array (CFA) is used before the sensor to obtain RGB color images so that the
individual sensor element records light of a certain color. The remaining color
information is estimated from surrounding pixels through a process called CFA
interpolation or demosaicing. After demosaicing, the image goes through a num-
ber of post-processing operations (e.g., color correction, edge enhancement, and
compression) before it is saved on a storage device. As described in [28], most of
these components leave certain ‘fingerprints’ in the images, which can be utilized
in different image forensic tasks. Manufacturers generally employ different lens
systems in their different camera models, which causes lens distortion artifacts,
such as radial lens distortion, chromatic aberration, and vignetting. The CFA
layout and demosaicing process vary widely among different models and are
generally considered one of the most distinctive model-specific signatures. The
sensor pattern noise (SPN) is the most unique characteristic of a digital camera,
and it is used excessively in the literature for source identification. In addition
to the camera-internal processing operations, digital images face different ma-
nipulations when they are edited by different image editing softwares. Moreover,
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Fig. 1. General pipeline of available digital images.
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they are resized or re-compressed when uploaded to photo-sharing websites or
social media applications [3]. Therefore, image forensics techniques should be
made robust to these common manipulation operations.
3 Proposed Method
In this paper, we propose a CNN-based patch-level method for CMI and image
manipulation detection. A schematic representation of our proposed method is
shown in Fig. 2.
As shown, we first extract high quality clusters of size 256× 256 from an input
image. From each cluster, patches of size 64 × 64 are taken and fed to the L2-
constrained RemNet. It then generates a class probability map for each patch.
We assign a camera model or image manipulation type label to each cluster by
averaging the class probability maps of its patches. The final prediction is made
based on the majority voting on the labels of the clusters of an image.
As well known, CNNs in their standard form tend to learn content-specific
features from the training images. In designing CNNs for image forensic tasks, it
has been, therefore, a common practice to use a preprocessing scheme to suppress
the image contents and intensify the minute signatures induced by the image
acquisition pipeline or image manipulation operation. Unlike the conventional
approaches, the benefit of designing a dynamic preprocessing block is that it
can adapt itself optimally to perform different image forensic tasks. To this end,
we propose a general-purpose novel CNN architecture, called L2-constrained
RemNet. A data-driven preprocessing block coupled with L2 loss is used at the
beginning of the network, which is followed by a classification block. A line
diagram of the proposed network model is shown in Fig. 3. The details of our
proposed model are presented in the following.
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Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the proposed method for CMI and image manipu-
lation detection.
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Fig. 4. Architecture of our proposed L2-constrained RemNet. The overall architecture
with preprocessor block and the classification block is illustrated in (a). The structure of
the remnant blocks and the classification blocks are shown in (b) and (c), respectively.
Here, AvgPool and Conv2D stand for average pooling and 2D convolution, respectively.
The letters F, K, and S represent the number of filters, their kernel size, and strides,
respectively.
3.1 Preprocessing block
We use the remnant blocks proposed in [37] as our preprocessing block. The
architecture is influenced by the highway networks [39]. The inherent camera
model-specific features are very subtle and minute features of the image [41],
[29], [13]. The problem of diminishing minute model-specific features is allevi-
ated in the remnant block through the use of skip connections. Also, it refrains
the minute features from being lost in a layer. Moreover, it resolves the vanish-
ing gradient problem [44] during training. The use of activation is avoided in
the remnant blocks as per the design requirements in [4]. Also, it is motivated
by our wish to make them perform as optimal digital filters. The final layer of
a remnant block is subtracted from its input in a pixelwise manner. This sub-
traction helps regulate information flow. While choosing the depth of a remnant
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Table 1. Architecture of Our Proposed L2-constrained RemNet
Layers Output Size Kernels*
Remnant Block 1 64×64×3 f1 = 64
Remnant Block 2 64×64×3 f2 = 128
Remnant Block 3 64×64×3 f3 = 256
Classification Block
Conv 2D, BN, &
PReLU
32×32×64 F = 64, K =
7×7, S = 2
Conv 2D, BN, &
PReLU
16×16×128 F = 128, K =
5×5, S = 2
Conv 2D, BN, &
PReLU
8×8×256 F = 256, K =
3×3, S = 2
Conv 2D, BN, &
PReLU
4×4×512 F = 512, K =
2×2, S = 2
Average Pool 1×1×512 K = 4×4
Conv 2D 1×1×N F = N, K = 1×1,
S = 1
Softmax N –
* Here, F, K, and S represent the number of filters,
kernel size, and strides, respectively. N represents the
number of class.
block, the number of filters in each convolutional layer, and kernel size– we use
the hyperparameters proposed in [37]. The architecture of the remnant block is
illustrated in Fig. 4.
Each remnant block has three convolutional layers. The kernel size is cho-
sen as 3 × 3. Each layer is followed by BN (batch normalization). The feature
space is widened from 64× 64× 3 to 64× 64× fi in the first two convolutional
layers and then reduced to the original dimension again. The output of the last
convolutional layer is subtracted from the input. As the convolutional layers are
followed by BN, the input to the block is batch normalized as well. To preserve
input information throughout a block, the input is propagated to every convolu-
tional layer inside the block. We use three remnant blocks in total. 64, 128, and
256 are chosen as fi for the consecutive remnant blocks.
3.2 Classification Block
We use the classifier proposed in [37] as our classification block as well. The
output of the preprocessing block is passed a classification block. The architec-
ture of the classification block is provided in Table 1. It extracts higher-level
image forensics features by gradually reducing the dimensions of the feature
space, and finally provide a class probability of the source camera model or the
manipulation type of the input image.
The classification block starts with four convolutional layers. Each of the
first four convolutional layers is followed by a BN layer and a PReLU activation.
The output of the fourth convolutional layer is followed by an average-pooling
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operation. Lastly, a final convolutional layer with softmax activation is used
to generate a probability for the final prediction. The design choices for the
classification block are the same as the hyperparameters proposed in [37]. There
are no fully connected layers in the classification block, which keeps the number
of parameters less. Consequently, the network is less prone to overfitting and
trains within a shorter time.
3.3 Loss Function
The preprocessing block contains M remnant blocks. The i-th remnant block
applies a transformation Hi on its input xi (which is also the output of the
(i− 1)-th remnant block) and subtracts it from its input to produce the output
ypi :
ypi = xi −H (xi,Wpi) , (1)
The output of the last remnant block is ypM . A loss is calculated based on a
flattened version of this output:
L2 =
Nparam∑
l=1
y2pMl
. (2)
Here, ypMl is the l-th element of ypM and Nparam is the total number of elements
in ypM . Afterwards, ypM is fed the classifier block that applies a transformation
G to generate the final output yc:
yc = G (ypM ,Wc) . (3)
We calculate categorical crossentropy loss between this output and the ground
truth using:
Lxent =
Nclass∑
k=1
y∗(k)ci log
(
y(k)ci
)
. (4)
where y
∗(k)
ci and y
(k)
ci are the true label and the network output of the i-th image
at the k-th class among the Nclass classes, respectively,. The total loss L is
defined using the following equation:
L = α ∗ L2 + Lxent. (5)
Here, α indicates how much weight we want to put in the suppression of
the residue from the preprocessor block. A larger choice for α may cause the
vanishing gradient problem for the classifier [44]. We empirically set the value
of α as 0.5. During backpropagation, the gradient of L2 is used to update the
weights of the preprocessing block. The gradient of Lxent is used to update
the weights of both the preprocessing block and the classifier block. The whole
network is trained in an end-to-end manner. The preprocessing block outputs
a residue of the input, and L2 attempts to minimize this output, which results
in suppression of image contents. Simultaneously, the classifier tries to extract
L2-Constrained RemNet 9
useful features from this residue for accurate predictions to minimize Lxent.
Minimization of L results in rich image forensics features in the residue for the
classifier block.
4 Experimental Results
We perform a number of experiments to prove the efficacy of our proposed
method. We discuss the experiments and the results in this section.
4.1 Camera Model Identification
We evaluate our L2-constrained RemNet on Dresden Dataset [23]. The dataset
contains images captured with 73 devices of 27 different camera models. Multiple
snaps have been captured from different scenes for each device. We discard eight
camera models to choose the specific camera models, which have images captured
using more than one device. Our goal is to keep one device excluded during
training and use it only for testing. Also, we consider Nikon D70 and Nikon
D70s, as a single camera model, according to [28]. We end up with 18 camera
models. We split the dataset into train, validation, and test sets following strict
criteria that the camera device and scenes used during testing are not used for
training or validation. This results in 7938, 1353, and 540 images in the train,
validation, and test set, respectively. These criteria, proposed in [28] and used
in [8], is quite necessary to make sure that the evaluation is not biased owing to
device-specific features and scene-specific features.
Data augmentation is a commonly used method in deep learning to reduce
overfitting. Recently, researchers have started using it for CMI as well [49], [36],
[37]. Also, our goal is to perform CMI from both unaltered and manipulated
images. Therefore, we choose different image manipulations as our data aug-
mentations, as proposed in [37]. The types of augmentation that we use in this
work are:
◦ JPEG-Compression with a quality factor of 70%, 80%, and 90%
◦ Resizing by a factor of 0.5, 0.8, 1.5, and 2.0
◦ Gamma-Correction with a factor of γ = 0.8 and 1.2
This increases our data by nine folds. Afterward, we extract clusters of 256×
256 size from the images. However, saturated and flat regions inside an image
are not less likely to contain features related to CMI. Therefore, we follow the
selection strategy proposed in [8], [37] to extract high quality image clusters. For
every cluster P in an image, its quality Q(P) is computed as
Q(P) = 1
3
∑
c∈[R,G,B]
[
α · β · (µc − µ2c) + (1− α) · (1− eγσc)
]
(6)
where α, β, and γ are empirically set constants (set to 0.7, 4 and ln(0.01),
respectively), µc and σc, c ∈ [R,G,B] are the mean and standard deviation of
the red, green, and blue components of cluster P, respectively.
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Although we extract 256 × 256 sized high quality clusters, we use 64 × 64
input size for our network according to [50], [8], [52], [37]. Patches of 64 × 64
are randomly selected from a cluster of 256× 256 during training. This strategy
introduces statistical variations during training which is discussed in detail in
[37]. We extract 20 clusters of size 256 × 256 from each image and this results
in 1587600 and 270600 train and validation clusters. We use our custom loss
function (see subsection 3.3) and Adam [27] optimizer with exponential decay
rate factors β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999. The choice for our batch size is 64. The
learning rate starts with 10−3 and we decrease it with a factor of 0.5 if the
softmax classification loss (Lxent) does not decrease in three successive epochs.
We train our network for a maximum of 70 epochs and save the weight with the
least validation softmax classification loss for evaluation.
The test set contains 10800 clusters of size 256 × 256 from 540 full images.
During testing, we average the predictions on all non-overlapping patches of size
64 × 64 to make a prediction for a cluster and assign a camera model label Lˆn
to it. We use majority voting to make the final prediction Lˆ for the full image.
The metric we use for evaluating the performance of our models is provided in
the following equation:
Accuracy =
NC
NT
. (7)
Here, NC is the number of correct prediction and NT is the total number
of test images. We also compare our results with four other state-of-art CNNs
in CMI [4], fusion residual networks [50], [8], and [37]. Moreover, we provide
comparison with two other popular deep CNNs, ResNet [24] and DenseNet [25]
as they have been used for image forensics as well [15], [2], [9], [36]. We use the
same input size for all the networks for fair comparison.
At first, we evaluate the performance of the models on the unaltered test
dataset. L2-constrained RemNet achieves an overall accuracy of 98.15%, which
is better than all other approaches we compare with (see Table 2). It should be
noted that we set the value for α in our custom loss function (5) empirically. We
Table 2. Accuracy (in %) of different methods in CMI for unaltered test dataset
Method Dresden Dataset
Yang et al. [50] 95.19
Bayar and Stamm. [4] 93.89
Bondi et al. [8] 92.59
DenseNet [25] 95.05
ResNet [24] 95.19
ResNeXt [48] 95.55
RemNet without
preprocessing block [37]
95.74
RemNet [37] 97.59
Proposed Method 98.15
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Table 3. Accuracy (in %) of different methods in CMI for manipulated test dataset
Method Gamma Correction JPEG Compression Resize Scale
0.5 0.75 1.25 1.5 95 90 85 80 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2
Yang et
al. [50]
94.26 95.37 95.00 92.78 94.07 94.07 92.59 92.59 94.26 92.59 90.93 90.56
Bayar
and
Stamm.
[4]
93.52 94.44 94.44 94.63 92.59 94.81 88.15 85.74 88.15 87.04 64.44 59.07
Bondi et
al. [8]
85.92 91.85 89.07 92.03 84.07 85.92 91.48 90.74 92.56 92.77 91.48 89.44
DenseNet
[25]
91.66 95.18 92.03 94.62 92.77 92.96 94.26 94.81 95.00 94.81 94.44 94.26
ResNet
[24]
91.85 95.18 92.77 94.81 93.88 94.82 95.55 95.00 95.18 95.18 95.00 95.18
ResNeXt
[48]
94.25 95.55 93.88 95.18 95.18 94.82 94.25 94.07 95.00 95.00 96.11 95.55
RemNet
[37]
96.11 97.22 96.11 95.56 97.59 94.82 92.59 92.78 95.00 93.33 92.04 92.41
Proposed
Method
96.29 98.14 97.59 97.96 92.96 93.33 96.11 97.03 96.67 96.67 90.74 91.66
have achieved accuracy of 97.77%, 98.15%, and 97.77%, when α is chosen as 0.1,
0.5, and 1, respectively. Therefore, we propose using α = 0.5.
We perform several experiments to justify the use of the L2-constrained pre-
processing block in our network. First, we train the RemNet without any pre-
processing block at the beginning of the network, that is, we only train the
classification block. Then, we train the RemNet without any auxiliary L2 loss at
the output of the preprocessing block. Afterward, we experiment with replacing
the L2 loss with the L1 loss. The lower accuracy of the RemNet without the pre-
processing block justifies the use of the preprocessing step. Similarly, the lower
accuracy of RemNet without any additional loss justifies the use of the auxil-
iary loss. When we use the L1 loss in our custom loss function, the total loss
oscillates throughout the training and does not converge. After a complete run,
the L1-constrained RemNet attains an accuracy of 58.88%. The L1 loss enforces
sparsity on the output of the preprocessing block, whereas the image forensics
features, in this case, are non-sparse and present throughout the image. The
L2 loss forces the output of the preprocessing block to be small and provides a
non-sparse solution.
Furthermore, we apply various manipulations on the test set and evaluate the
performance of our method. To make sure that the network has not overfitted on
the manipulation factors used during training, we also manipulate the test images
with factors that are not used during training. The test images are created using
gamma correction with γ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.25, and 1.5; JPEG compression quality
factors (QFs) 95%, 90%, 85%, and 80%; and resize scaling factor of 0.8, 0.9, 1.1,
1.2. The highest result for each manipulation factor is made bold (see Table 3).
We can see that our proposed method has substantial improvement over other
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methods for Gamma Correction. In the case of JPEG Compression, our network
achieves better performance for two factors, and RemNet [37] achieves better
performance in two. For Resize manipulation, we see that ResNeXt [48] gains
higher accuracy for two manipulation factors, whereas our proposed method
gains higher accuracy in the other two factors. We can conclude that our pro-
posed method proves to be most robust to external manipulation. Also, deep
CNNs perform better than shallow networks in the face of manipulated images.
4.2 Image Manipulation Detection
Now, we show the use of our network in a completely different image forensic
task. We use it to identify the kind of image-manipulation done on an image.
The same network is used here except the number of output classes, which is
four– unaltered, rescale, JPEG compression, and gamma correction. The input
size for all the networks is also maintained at (64× 64). We use the same train
and validation set from our experiments with CMI and sub-divide it into the
four manipulation classes. The L2-constrained RemNet is then trained to detect
the type of manipulation applied to an image. It is to be mentioned that, during
training, our dataset consisting of 1587600 train and 270600 validation clusters
has been reduced in order to make the training data evenly distributed among
four classes. Since the number of unaltered train and validation clusters are
158760 and 27060, respectively, we select 158760 train and 27060 validation
clusters randomly for each type of manipulation.
In testing, we have used the test images from the Dresden dataset and gener-
ated a total of 540×12 = 6480 test images, which include 540 unaltered images;
540 × 4 = 2160 gamma-corrected images with γ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.25, and 1.5;
540× 3 = 1620 JPEG compressed images compressed with factors of 85%, 90%,
and 95%; and 540 × 4 = 2160 resized images images with scaling factor of 0.8,
0.9, 1.1, and 1.2. Details of the results are given in Table 5. We achieve an overall
accuracy of 99.68% in this task whereas RemNet [37], Bayar and Stamm [4], and
Yang et al. [50] achieve 98.27%, 87.28% and 91.74%, respectively (see Table 4).
We demonstrate the detection accuracy for different factors of manipulation in
Table 5. For gamma-corrected images, the performances of [50], RemNet [37]
and our proposed method are substantially better than that of [4]. In the case
of JPEG compression, all four networks perform almost the same except at the
compression factor of 95, where [4] and [50] fail miserably by misclassifying most
of the compressed images as unaltered images. There is a significant drop in the
Table 4. Accuracy (in %) of different methods in image manipulation detection
Method Dresden Dataset
Yang et al. [50] 91.74
Bayar and Stamm [4] 87.28
RemNet [37] 98.27
Proposed Method 99.68
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Table 5. Accuracy (in %) of image manipulation detection for different manipulation
factors
Method Gamma Correction JPEG Compression Rescale
0.5 0.75 1.25 1.5 95 90 85 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2
Yang et
al. [50]
99.07 98.52 97.04 98.70 49.44 100 100 100 97.40 60.74 100
Bayar
and
Stamm
[4]
94.44 83.33 77.22 90.56 11.30 100 100 100 100 90.93 99.63
RemNet
[37]
100 99.81 99.63 100 81.48 98.33 100 100 100 100 100
Proposed
method
100 99.63 99.26 98.7 100 98.7 100 100 100 100 100
detection accuracy for RemNet [37] as well. This is expected since there is very
little difference between the original image and JPEG compressed image with
factor 95. However, our proposed method achieves 100% accuracy even at this
factor, which indicates that the network can detect even minute manipulation
artifacts introduced during manipulation operation. When detecting rescaled
images, our network and RemNet [37] performs the same by attaining a 100%
accuracy. Of the other two networks, [4] performs better than [50].
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an L2 loss constrained RemNet for perform-
ing two important image forensics tasks, namely, CMI and image manipulation
detection. The proposed modular CNN model comprises of a dynamic preproces-
sor and a classification block in series. The L2-constrained preprocessor, while
trained end-to-end along with the classification block, suppresses unnecessary
image contents dynamically and generates a residue of the image from where
the classification block can easily extract image forensics features. We have com-
prehensively conducted multiple experiments on the Dresden dataset to demon-
strate the efficacy of such a preprocessing scheme assisted by the L2 loss in CMI.
During testing, we use images captured by devices not seen during training to
replicate practical applications. The results of the experiments have shown that
our proposed method can be successfully used in real-world scenarios. Addition-
ally, we have used our proposed method for image manipulation detection. The
satisfactory performances of our network on both classification tasks prove that
it can be used for a general-purpose network for image forensics.
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